Dmitry Kronberg, a Russian mathematician, revealed errors in the protocol of quantum cryptography using phase-time coding. These errors allow “quantum hackers” to invisibly intercept the data by simulating the signal attenuation in the communication channel. The article describing this hacking technique was published in the journal Theoretical and Mathematical Physics.
“The rationale for the resistance of this protocol was carried out with errors. We have a specific simple attack that demonstrates the overstatement of the key generation, this means that part of the key can be known to the interceptor. Moreover, we showed that with a number of attack parameters you can achieve The fact that the entire key is known for the interceptor, while legitimate users will be sure that the key is completely secret, ”the scientist says.
over 20 years, scientists and engineers have created many quantum communication lines that are impossible to hack or eavesdrop on due to the fact that any attempt to read data from a protected quantum communication line will violate the quantum state of the particles used to transmit information, and thereby give out a cracker .
existing quantum lines are not effective enough in the implementation of the principles on which they are based. The Russian “Quantum Hacker” Vadim Makarov and his colleagues previously demonstrated that the sources and receivers of quantum signals used in such systems can be “blinded” with a powerful laser, putting them into non -viant mode of operation and making information susceptible to reading without noticeable signs of intervention.
Dmitry Kronberg, a researcher from the Mathematical Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences in Moscow, found that the communication channels using the quantum cryptography protocol with phase-time coding could be hacked by simulating a natural attenuation of the signal. Such an attack can read the entire transmitted key, imperceptibly for other network participants.
The researcher indicates that this method for organizing quantum communication uses three temporary “windows” to determine how the recipient must read single photons when receiving them from another participant in the quantum network. Theoretically, the appearance of certain errors when reading the states of these particles should indicate an attempt by someone to “eavesdropped” the signal.
Thus, according to Cronberg’s calculations, even short communication lines that are not subject to a strong fading signal can be attacked. The mathematician hopes that the results of his research will help to modify the protocol so that his new versions become more protected from hacking than existing.